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1 Introduction
Many experience goods, such as movies, video games, books, CDs, concerts, and sporting
events, enter the market, have a very short life cycle, and exit. Competing rms launch them
regularly, often on a weekly basis. Their success depends on how much buzz their advertising
campaigns create before their products enter the market (Karniouchina, 2011; Liu, 2006),
but also on how much rms have invested in their productsquality (Kopalle & Lehmann,
2006). Both decisions are critical to win the competition, because future sales depend not
just on advertising but also on the judgments of the consumers who actually experience the
quality of the products and create word of mouth (Bass, 1969; Mahajan, Muller, & Kerin,
1984).
We consider a parsimonious, strategic competition setting for experience goods in which
rms compete for the same target, launch their products at the same time, and decide
how much to invest in advertising and quality. Several features distinguish our model from
existing literature. First, we design our model to apply to the motion picture industry. Most
marketing literature that refers to this industry focuses on the e¤ects of advertising on sales
and prots (Ainslie, Dréze, & Zufryden, 2005; Basuroy, Desai, & Talukdar, 2006; Elberse &
Anand, 2007; Elberse & Eliashberg, 2003; Hennig-Thurau, Houston, & Sridhar, 2006; Joshi
& Hanssens, 2009; Prag & Casavant, 1994; Zufryden, 1996). Yet few studies investigate
how studio producers compete strategically. In this paper we investigate which investment
strategies studios should use, and how their decisions impact studiosprots.
Second, we link studiosbudget decisions to the positioning of competing movies in the
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market. Studios can position their movies close to or far from the mainstream. When
movies approach the mainstream, they aim at the mass market or the average preferences
of the target segment, whereas when they move away from the mainstream, they focus on
customer niches with more extreme preferences (Gemser, Van Oostrum, & Leenders, 2007;
Zuckerman & Kim, 2003). Thus, our model also provides information about launching more
or less mainstream movies.
Third, we take advantage of a stimulating method of analysis that exploits the interplay
between analytical modeling and agent-based modeling (Rand & Rust, 2011). We begin
by studying a duopolistic competitive setting with an analytical model and solve it using a
standard game-theoretical technique. Next, we use an agent-based model (ABM) to relax
several assumptions of the game-theoretical model and investigate more realistic market
situations. In our ABM, studios decide how much to invest in advertising and in quality
using two simple and realistic decision rules: a repeat/imitate rule in which a studio repeats
its decision if it performed better than the competitor or copies the decision of the competitor
if it performed worse; and a trend rule in which studios simply follow recent protable
trends. In this way, we use the analytical model to achieve generalizability and the ABM to
investigate interesting extensions of the model that more realistically adhere to the motion
picture industry. Specically, our ABM allows us to study symmetric as well as asymmetric
positioning, competitions among big and/or small studios, settings with more than two
competitors, and a number of more realistic features of the market.
With these advances, we obtain several interesting results. First, focusing on two major
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studios positioning their movies equidistant from the mainstream, we nd that strategies
based on the trend rule are the most protable. However, this occurs only with symmetric
positioning. When studios do not position their movies equidistant from the mainstream
and use di¤erent rules, the dynamics of the competition change substantially. We nd that if
a studio uses the trend rule, the competitor can obtain high prots using the repeat/imitate
rule as well. This makes the competition very critical because if both studios use the re-
peat/imitate rule in an attempt to beat each other, they end up with signicantly lower
prots. Second, when simulating competitions between big and small studios, we nd that
the major studio should use the repeat/imitate rule, invest substantial budgets, and position
very close to the mainstream; whereas the small studio should take some distance from the
mainstream only if it reduces its investment considerably by using the trend rule. Third,
we conduct several robustness checks and an additional study in which we simulate a mar-
ket with more than two studios that use weighted and evolving decision rules. In all these
cases our results contribute to explaining why competition in this industry is very tough and
prots are so low.
2 Competition in the motion picture industry
2.1 Head-to-head competition
We begin by modeling competition between two lm studio producers that release their
movies at the same time that is, head-to-head (Krider & Weinberg, 1998). Head-to-head
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competition occurs very often in reality, especially during high-demand periods (e.g., the
Christmas season, pre-award periods), when powerful studios engage in erce competition
in the launch of their movies (Epstein, 2010, Krider & Weinberg, 1998).
In our model, two studios (i = 1; 2) produce and simultaneously release their movies after
making choices about two strategic variables: how much to invest in advertising the new
movie ai, and how much to invest in making a good movie bi. Similar to Krider andWeinberg
(1998), we model competition between the two movies in a share attraction framework:
When the studio allocates its money, it presumes that more prelaunch advertising increases
its share of voice and lures more consumers to see its movie (Bell, Keeney & Little, 1975;
Jones, 1990; Schroer, 1990). Furthermore, the studio assumes that investing more in making
the movie will increase its quality (Kopalle & Lehmann, 2006). We illustrate this competitive
setting from the point of view of studio i = 1 in Figure 1.
Figure 1 about here.
We collapse the movie life cycle into two periods, such that consumers attend Movie 1
at either its launch or at its post-launch. In our shared attraction framework, at launch,
consumers are more attracted to Movie 1 if they have been exposed to more pre-launch
advertising of Movie 1 than Movie 2 that is, when a1 is greater and a2 is smaller. We let
qL1 indicate viewership of Movie 1 at launch. In the post-launch period, consumersattrac-
tion to Movie 1 depends on word-of-mouth e¤ect, WOM1. In line with extant literature on
innovation di¤usion and word of mouth in the motion picture industry, we anticipate that
WOM1 depends on two factors: its volume, or the number of consumers who have experi-
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enced the movie at launch (qL1 ), and its valence, which the studio can increase by investing
more in quality and producing higher-quality products that invoke better judgments from
experienced consumers (Bass, 1969; Godes & Mayzlin, 2009; Liu, 2006; Neelamegham &
Chintagunta 1999; Peres, Muller, & Mahajan, 2010). In turn, WOM1s volume and valence
determine viewership of Movie 1 in the post-launch period, which we indicate with qPL1 .
2.2 Movie positioning
Borrowing from extant marketing studies on strategic competition and location models
(Hotelling, 1929; Hauser, 1988; Moorthy, 1988; Vandenbosch &Weinberg, 1995) that formal-
ize consumerspreferences as tastes on the horizontal dimension (Desai, 2001; Liu, Putler,
& Weinberg, 2004), we model two studios that face a target segment of N consumers with
heterogeneous preferences j  U[0;1] and position movies of type Pi for the same target
segment, as in Figure 2. Their movies can be close to or far from the mainstream, such
that more mainstream movies aim at the mass market and less mainstream movies focus
on the edges of the market (Gemser, Van Oostrum, & Leenders, 2007; Zuckerman & Kim,
2003). This distinction is very common in the motion picture market, and our location model
adequately captures it: Movies located toward the center of the target segment are more
mainstream because they are closer to the average preference of the market, whereas movies
that are near the edges are less mainstream products that meet more extreme preferences.
Graphs A and B show symmetric competition by movies equidistant from the average
consumer, such that P1 = 0:5   d and P2 = 0:5 + d, where d indicates how distant the two
5
movies are from the mainstream. When d decreases, the two major studios move toward
the mainstream, and their movies become more similar. Obviously, studios are attracted
to the center of the target segment, because from that location they can more easily meet
the preferences of consumers; it is where a monopolistic studio ideally would locate. How-
ever, when approaching the mainstream, the two competing studios exacerbate competition
because their movies become more similar and attract the same consumers.
Graph C instead illustrates an asymmetric competition with one studio that dominates
the center of the target segment and launches a typical mainstream movie that meets the
average preferences of the target segment, and another studio that launches a less mainstream
movie aimed at more extreme preferences.
Figure 2 about here
Our formalization is based on the idea that mainstream movies are closer to the average
preference of the market. We acknowledge that this is not the only way of modeling the
mainstream. One may think of alternative formalizations of the mainstream concept using
a location model a la Hotelling. For example, one may think of a mainstream movie as
a segment, instead of a point, that covers a bigger part of the market and attracts more
preferences. In Appendix C we propose a formalization in this direction and then in the
discussion section we address its implications.
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2.3 Moviegoersbehavior and studiosprots
We consider a market with N consumers.We dene the attraction of a consumer j to studio
is movie at launch as ALij = U
L
ij   , where ULij is the utility of seeing movie i at launch
and   0 is the outside good, or utility derived from other leisure activities. At launch,
consumer j sees the movie with the highest positive attraction. If the attractions of both
movies are negative, consumer j prefers the outside good and does not see any movie. Then,
at post-launch, consumer j considers only the movies not seen at launch. It is attracted
to studio is movie by APLij = U
PL
ij   , where UPLij indicates the utility of seeing movie i
at post-launch. Note that in this formalization, consumer j cannot see the same movie at
launch and at post-launch. We model the utilities as follows:
ULij =
p
ai
c+ j j   Pi j , (1)
UPLij =
WOMi
c+ j j   Pi j , and (2)
WOMi =  q
L
i
Qi, (3)
where jj   Pij indicates the distance between the consumers preference j and the movies
type Pi, that is, how well the movie released by studio i matches the tastes of consumer
j. The quantity c > 0 is a parameter that restricts utilities to nite values, as in discrete
choice models (Chintagunta, 2002). This parameter reects the practical constraints of the
movies consumption, such as the distance to the theater, its comfort, and so forth. In
Equation 1, we assume decreasing returns to advertising expenditures (Assmus, Farley, &
Lehmann, 1984; Simon & Arndt, 1980). In Equations 2 and 3, we dene post-launch utility
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and word of mouth. We specify that WOMi consists of volume, valence, and persuasiveness
(Neelamegham & Chintagunta, 1999). Volume equals viewership at launch qLi , and valence is
a quality indicator that depends on the average valuation of consumers who have experienced
movie i, Qi. Assuming that the valuation Q
j
i of consumer j for movie i is an iid variable
with Qji =
p
bi + "
j
i and E("
j
i ) = 0, such that Qi =
p
bi, we capture the idea that studios,
when deciding to invest in making the movie, expect to increase quality and the valence of
word of mouth by increasing their investment in quality. Also for quality investment, we
assume decreasing returns. Finally, persuasiveness, measured by , species how much word
of mouth a¤ects utilities, such that it indicates the strength of word of mouth in the cinema
market.
Because qLi refers to viewership at launch (i.e., how many consumers see movie i at its
launch) and qPLi indicates viewership at post-launch (i.e., how many consumers see movie
i at its post-launch), we can indicate cumulative viewership as qCUMi = q
L
i + q
PL
i . In the
motion picture industry, total viewership is a clear indicator of the theatrical success of
the movie because the ticket price is xed across movies. Thus, the cumulative viewership
qCUMi is a suitable measure of box o¢ ce revenues. We measure studio is performance as
the di¤erence between cumulative viewership and total budget investments. We call this
measure i because it indicates the prot of studio i:
i = q
CUM
i   (ai + bi). (4)
In Appendix A we provide a numerical example that describes how the budget choices ai
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and bi result in studiosprots i.
2.4 Assumptions
As with every model, our parsimonious competition setting requires several simplifying as-
sumptions. In our formalization, we assume head-to-head competition, xed total demand,
and no repeated consumption. These assumptions are common in prior literature and sup-
ported in the real market. Head-to-head competition is frequent (Epstein, 2010); especially
in periods of high demand, big studios launch their new movies on exactly the same day (in
the United States usually a Friday). In Appendix E we provide empirical evidence for the
conceptual framework of head-to-head competition. Fixed total demand is also a plausible
assumption. More rarely, some movies are so popular and well-advertised that that they
increase primary demand (e.g., Titanic, Harry Potter and the Sorcerers Stone, Avatar),
most of the time, studios rely on previous years statistics to estimate total demand and
plan their budget investments (Epstein, 2010). We also assume no repeated consumption, in
that if a consumer has seen a movie at launch, he or she will not see the same movie again
in the post-launch period. Although some revisits are possible in reality, it seems reasonable
to consider them rare cases, at least for the theatrical lifecycle of a movie (Hennig-Thurau
et al. 2007; Weinberg, 2005).
Another important set of assumptions for our parsimonious competition setting pertains
to the strategic variables and their e¤ects on viewership, as described in Figure 1. First,
in our model, attendance at post-launch is a¤ected by advertising only through word of
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mouth. This implies a certain stylization of the advertising e¤ect, however, many studies
on the motion picture market have found that advertising e¤ects are seen mainly at launch
because ad expenditures are concentrated right before the release (Elberse & Anand, 2007)
and decrease very rapidly after launch (Ainslie, Dréze & Zufryden, 2005; Dellarocas, Zhang,
& Awad, 2007; Elberse & Elaishberg, 2003; Zufryden, 1996). Moreover, Chen, Chen &
Weinberg (2013) found that rst-stage performance that is, attendance in the opening
week has a much stronger e¤ect on subsequent attendance than advertising. This empirical
evidence supports our model specication and conrms that most of the advertising e¤ect
drains away at launch.
Second, we predict that on average and all things being equal, more money spent to
make a movie leads to higher quality (Prag & Casavant, 1994). Other studies rely on
several indicators of quality, such as reviews, expertsor popular judgments, and production
budgets (Hennig-Thurau, Houston, & Sridhar, 2006; Holbrook, 1999, 2005; Holbrook &
Addis, 2008). Of course, some movies with high investments turn out to be ops, and other
movies produced with a very low budget are very successful. However, before shooting the
movie, when studios must allocate money to make it, success is di¢ cult to forecast. It
therefore seems reasonable to predict that when studios decide how to allocate their money,
they assume that the more they invest in the production, the higher the quality of the nal
product should be. Whether they spend their money e¢ ciently and obtain a good or bad
movie is not formalized in our competitive setting.
Third, the e¤ects of the investment in quality accrue not at launch but only during
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the post-launch period, through word of mouth. In our formalization, money spent in
producing the movie should enhance the real quality of the movie. Because movies are
mainly experience goods, which must be consumed before their real quality can be observed
(Darby & Karni, 1973), we assume that quality is not disclosed at launch. Only at a later
stage, when real quality is public and experienced consumers can also communicate it to other
consumers, does quality a¤ect viewership. This assumption matches Godes and Mayzlins
(2009) theoretical formalization of word of mouth, in that the real quality communicated by
experienced consumers in our model refers to consumer-created word of mouth.
3 The analytical benchmark
In this section, we explicitly solve our parsimonious competition setting using standard game-
theoretical techniques. Employing a symmetric Nash equilibrium as our solution concept, we
derive a closed-form, analytical solution for the equilibrium values of advertising and quality
investments, ae and be, as well as the corresponding prots e. If we dene x =

N2
4
2
, we
can prove the following:
Proposition 1 There exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE), whereby advertising in-
vestment is ae = (c+ d)x, and quality investment is be = x. The studios obtain equilibrium
prots e = (1  c  d)x+N  1
2
  c  d.
The proof is provided in Appendix B.
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Our analytical benchmark provides initial results as the closed-form solution explicitly
indicates the relationship between the parameters of the model and studios investments
and prots. For example, the investment in quality (be) is higher as the market is larger
(N) and as the utility of other leisure activities () is smaller. In that case, it makes sense
to attract people to the cinema by investing in movie quality. Furthermore, our analytical
benchmark indicates that when the distance of the movies from the mainstream (d) increases,
the advertising investments of the two studios increase, but their quality investments remain
constant and their prots decrease. This is an interesting result because it indicates that
when movies are more distant from the mainstream, they invest more in advertising to
attract the preferences of the mainstream, but this extra investment is ine¤ective; it only
exacerbates the erce pre-launch advertising battle of the two competing studios, and it
results in lower prots.
This closed-form solution represents a general and solid analytical benchmark, which
represents a hypothetical world in which the studios are fully rational. However, to solve the
theoretical-game, we are forced to make additional stringent assumptions. For example, to
facilitate our calculations, we must impose symmetrical positioning and equal investments
in advertising and quality. In the next section we propose an ABM that can relax many of
these additional assumptions and test interesting extensions of our model.
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4 The ABM
In our ABM, a single time step of the simulation run reects the entire competitive setting
of Figure 1. That is, at time step t, two studios (i = 1; 2) produce and advertise their
movies, making investment decisions about ait and bit, release their movies simultaneously,
gather their viewership in two periods at launch qLit and post-launch q
PL
it  and nally exit
the market. At time step t + 1, the entire competitive setting repeats again. The two
studios update their investments in advertising and quality, ait+1 and bit+1, release them
head-to-head, obtain new viewership, and again exit the market.
With respect to the game-theoretical model, we formalize the utilities of the consumers
and the prot function as in Equations 1  4 and simply add a time dimension as follows:
ULijt =
p
ait
c+ j j   Pi j , (5)
UPLijt =
WOMit
c+ j j   Pi j , (6)
WOMit =  q
L
it
Qit, (7)
it = q
CUM
it   (ait + bit). (8)
4.1 Studiosdecision rules
Competition is considered a key element of marketing strategy and the dominant opinion is
that competitor-orientation is indispensable for success (Clark & Montgomery, 1997). Day
and Reibstein (1997) qualify the failure to anticipate competitorsmoves as a major strategic
error. Furthermore, Montgomery, Moore, and Urbany (2005) show that managers actually
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think a lot about competitorspast and current behavior. However, there is also another
school of competition, maintaining that it is better to ignore competition altogether and
focus on a companys own strengths. For example, based on laboratory and eld studies,
Armstrong and Collopy (1996) conclude that the use of competitor-oriented objectives is
detrimental to protability. Moreover, the Blue Ocean Strategy by Kim and Mauborgne
(2004) is in the same spirit: Companies should not be pre-occupied with competition, but
should concentrate on developing their own market space.
In our ABM, we have represented these two views on competition in two di¤erent deci-
sion rules: (i) the repeat/imitate rule and (ii) the trend rule. Both are simple quantitative
behavioral rules to update budget investments in advertising and quality. They are based on
empirical regularities and the well-established behavioral theory of the rm (Greve, 2003a;
March & Simon, 1958), and represent plausible rules of thumb that managers, marketers, and
practitioners use when making and advertising new movies (Vogel, 2011; Wierenga, 2011).
The repeat/imitate rule is competitor-oriented, whereas the trend rule totally ignores the
competitors behavior.
The repeat/imitate rule. Repetition and imitation have a long tradition in com-
petitive industries (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Schumpeter, 1942). Repetition enjoys em-
pirical support as rms often prefer to myopically repeat their behavior, especially if their
performance does not fall below a certain level (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Manns & March,
1978). Imitation is one of the most common heuristics for modeling myopic decision making
(Greve, 2003b; Lux, 1995; Rivkin, 2000; Salganik, Dodds & Watts, 2006), and it also enjoys
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empirical support in relation to many strategic interactions (Camerer, 2003; Greve, 2003b;
Schnaars, 2002). With this rule, the focal studio i updates its advertising and quality in-
vestments by comparing its own prot against the prot of the competitor ( i). The focal
studio repeats its investments in advertising and in quality if it earns more than or the same
as the competitor, and copies the competitors investments otherwise:
ait =
8>><>>:
if it 1   it 1 then ait 1;
otherwise ait 1
 
1  ait 1 a it 1
N

.
(5)
bit =
8>><>>:
if it 1   it 1 then bit 1;
otherwise bit 1

1  bit 1 b it 1
N

.
(6)
In Appendix D, we provide a numerical example for this rule.
The trend rule. According to the trend rule, rms follow recent protable trends
(Brock, Lakonishok, & LeBaron, 1992; de Bondt & Thaler, 1985; Hannan & Freeman, 1984;
Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993; Manns & March, 1978). Such myopic behavior often arises
in investors decisions (Brock, Lakonishok, & LeBaron, 1992; de Bondt & Thaler, 1985;
Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993) and has been modeled to simulate nancial markets (Barberis,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Hommes, 2001). Therefore, when using the trend rule, the focal
studio i keeps increasing (decreasing) investments if it enjoyed positive prot growth, whereas
15
it switches and changes its behavior if it encountered negative prot:
ait =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
if it 1 > it 2 then ait 1

1 + ait 1 ait 2
ait 2

;
if it 1 < it 2 then ait 1

1  ait 1 ait 2
ait 2

;
if it 1 = it 2 then ait 1.
(7)
bit =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
if it 1 > it 2 then bit 1

1 + bit 1 bit 2
bit 2

;
if it 1 < it 2 then bit 1

1  bit 1 bit 2
bit 2

;
if it 1 = it 2 then bit 1.
(8)
Thus, if at time step t   1 a studio increases its advertising budget (ait 1 ait 2
ait 2
> 0)
and the movie brings positive prot growth (it 1 > it 2), the studio continues to increase
its advertising at time step t. However, if the increase in advertising investment induces
negative growth (it 1 < it 2), in the next time step t, the studio decreases its advertising
budget. The same patterns hold for quality investment. We provide a numerical example in
Appendix D for the trend rule as well.
4.2 The design choices of the ABM, validation and verication
Rand and Rust (2011) delineate rigorous guidelines for building and using ABMs. They
recommend describing the design choices of the ABM and o¤ering precise indications for
how to validate and verify ABMs. We provide a description of how we have followed these
guidelines in Appendix E. Below, in Table 1 we summarize the parameters of the ABM,
including their default values and their rationales.
Table 1 about here.
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Our ABM is now ready to run. In our experiments, we re-ran each scenario with 100 sto-
chastic simulation runs, in which only the consumerspreferences j and the initial budgets
ai1 and bi1 are drawn randomly from the following distributions: j  U[0;1], ai1  U[1;N ],
and bi1  U[1;N ]. Each run keeps track of the evolving means for prot it, and stops
at T = 10; 000, or alternatively when the evolving mean of the prots of the two studios
converge (i.e., jiT   iT 1j < " with " = 0:0001).
5 Simulations
5.1 Study 1: Symmetric positioning
In this study we use our ABM to simulate a competition between two studios that use the
simple decision rules described above. As we are interested in symmetric positioning, we
impose that the two studios position their movies equidistant from the mainstream, with
Studio 1 on the left of the target segment, and Studio 2 on the right, i.e., P1 = 12   d and
P2 =
1
2
+ d (see Figure 2). To preserve symmetry, we also impose that the two studios
use the same decision rule. Thus, in this rst simulation experiment, we simulate only two
scenarios: in Scenario A both studios use the repeat/imitate rule, whereas in Scenario B
both studios use the trend rule.1 The ABM parameters are set at their default values, as
1 We note that having two studios that use the same decision rule does not necessarily imply that
they decide on identical investment allocations. In principle, this may invalidate the comparison between
the analytical model and the ABM because the analytical benchmark does impose identical investment
allocations. However, thats not the case. As our results show, although the two studios may invest di¤erently
at each time step of the simulation run, when they use the same decision rules, their investments and their
prots always converge toward similar values.
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indicated in Table 1.
Results are presented in Table 2. As results do not qualitatively di¤er between studios,
for exposition reasons, we report the results of Studio 1. The trend rule (Scenario B) is
clearly the most e¢ cient decision rule. It also outperforms the analytical benchmark. In
this scenario both studios invest very low budgets but earn high prots, whereas in Scenario
A, when they use the repeat/imitate rule, they invest a lot but earn negative prots. Figure
3 provides a further description of what happens in these scenarios, o¤ering the dynamics
of their typical runs, i.e., how prot it, investments ait and bit, and viewership qCUMit vary
during the simulation run. When using the trend rule, the two studios focus only on their own
prot, they do not copy each other and do not escalate their investments in an attempt to
prot more than the competitor. Instead, following protable trends, both studios lower their
investments in advertising and in quality. As the two studios lower investments together,
they calm competition, do not lose competitive power against each other, and maintain
their viewership. Thus, they both obtain high prots. In contrast, when both studios
use the repeat/imitate rule, they escalate their investment, aiming to earn more than the
competitor, but the result is negative prot.
Table 2 about here.
Figure 3 about here.
In this study we also investigate what happens when studios vary the positioning of their
movies, launching more- or less mainstream movies. We conduct another simulation experi-
ment by investigating ve di¤erent levels of symmetrical positioning, d = (:05; :15; :25; :35; :45),
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and rerunning Scenarios A and B for each level of d. The other parameters of the ABM are
set as before. Recall that, as illustrated in Figure 2, when the value of d is small, the two stu-
dios approach the center of the target segment and launch more mainstream movies. Figure
4 displays the results. Interestingly, we nd that when both studios use the trend rule, their
investments are very low and the level of d does not signicantly a¤ect their high prots,
which are permanently above 40. In contrast, when both studios use the repeat/imitate
rule, their investments are much higher and their prots are much lower, and signicantly
dependent on how close the movies are to the mainstream. For low levels of d, i.e., when
movies are close to the mainstream, the studiosprots are positive, whereas they become
negative when d  :25. This result conrms the insight of the analytical benchmark, which
suggests that studios prot more when they launch more mainstream movies. However, it
also indicates that such a relationship holds only if both studios use the repeat/imitate rule
and invest in large budgets. In contrast, if studios use the trend rule, they calm competition
and do not necessarily have to launch mainstream movies.
Figure 4 about here.
5.2 Study 2: Asymmetric positioning
Head-to-head duels between big lm studio producers are very common in the motion picture
industry. Abundant anecdotal evidence exists about head-to-head competition between very
similar movies. Examples include Sherlock Holmes: A Game of Shadows against Mission:
Impossible - Ghost Protocol (both movies are action and adventure) or The Muppets against
Arthur Christmas (comedies for children and families). Such empirical evidence supports
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the idea that symmetric positioning on the same target segment exists and is relevant. How-
ever, just as often studios release quite di¤erent movies. In many cases a studio releases a
typical mainstream movie whereas a competitor competes head-to-head with a less main-
stream movie. Recent examples are Fantastic Four (action and adventure) against The Gift
(2015) (mystery and thriller) or The Man From U.N.C.L.E. (action) against Straight Outta
Compton (biography and music).
In this second study we use our ABM to relax the assumption of symmetric positioning.
We no longer force studios to position equidistant from the mainstream and instead allow
them to use the positioning of their movies as a third strategic variable. We modify our
ABM such that the studios do not only decide on advertising and quality investments, ai
and bi, but also on how to position their movies, Pi. We extend the repeat/imitation rule
and the trend rule such that studios can also update Pi. In Appendix F we formally describe
the updating of Pi, which follows the same rationale as for ai and bi. The idea is that studios
can decide to produce more- or less mainstream movies, repeating their previous choices or
copying from the competitor; or alternatively they can follow recent protable positioning
trends.
In contrast to the previous study, in which both studios used the same decision rule,
in this study, we also relax the other element of symmetry, i.e., competing studios do not
necessarily use the same decision rules. Thus, in this study we investigate four scenarios: in
Scenario A both studios use the repeat/imitate rule; in Scenario B they both use the trend
rule; in Scenario C Studio 1 uses the repeat/imitate rule and Studio 2 uses the trend rule;
20
and in Scenario D Studio 1 uses the trend rule and Studio 2 uses the repeat/imitate rule.
The other parameters of the ABM are set at their default values.
The results of the simulations are reported in Table 3. Again, results do not qualitatively
di¤er between the two studios and for exposition purposes, we refer to Studio 1 only. As in
the previous study, in Scenario B Studio 1 obtains high prots because both studios ignore
each other, reduce costs, and calm competition without losing viewership. However, quite
interestingly, we nd that in Scenario C the prots of Studio 1 are also high. Although
the investments are much higher than in Scenario B, the prots are rather similar and not
statistically di¤erent, i.e., 48:01 and 42:13 (F = 2:64; p = :11). These results indicate that
the trend rule is very protable when both studios use it together (Scenario B), but they
also suggest that if the competitor uses the trend rule, using the repeat/imitate rule is also
protable (Scenario C). Thus, the trend rule is not necessarily the most protable decision
rule to use. Moreover, Table 3 also indicates that the trend rule can be even less benecial
than the repeat/imitate rule. If the competitor uses the repeat/imitate rule (Scenarios A
and D), then Studio 1 earns more when using the repeat/imitate rule than the trend rule. In
this case, comparing Scenarios A and D, we nd that the prots of Studio 1 are statistically
di¤erent: 7:60 and  :82, respectively (F = 9:1; p = :003).
These results provide initial indications about the stability of these rules. Even though
the two studios may see high prots using the trend rule, such a scenario does not necessarily
seem stable because, at any time, one of the two studios could switch to the repeat/imitate
rule and earn similar prots. In this study we have simulated scenarios in which studios
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keep using the same decision rule during the entire simulation run. However, in Study 4, we
will simulate a more realistic market in which studios can change their decision rules during
the simulation run and we will derive further indications of how protable and stable these
rules are in the real market.
In this second study, the studios can also use positioning as a strategic variable. Thus, we
obtain indications of how closely the two studios approach the mainstream in the di¤erent
scenarios. Recall that in our ABM, Studio 1 moves on the left side of the target segment, i.e.,
P1t =

0; 1
2

, and Studio 2 on the right side, i.e., P2t =

1
2
; 1

. Thus, the moviesdistances
from the mainstream dit =
1
2
  Pit
 can vary from 0 to 1
2
. The results reported in Table
3 indicate that when the studios use the repeat/imitate rule, they end up positioning very
close to the mainstream; whereas when they play the trend rule, they are rather distant from
the mainstream. This result is in line with the previous study as it conrms that when both
studios use the repeat/imitate rule, they tend to invest large budgets and should position
their movies close to the mainstream. In contrast, if a studio uses the trend rule, then it
lowers the investments and does not need to move toward the mainstream.
Table 3 about here.
5.3 Study 3: Major and independent studios
In Study 2 we investigated head-to-head competition with studios positioning their movies
asymmetrically. In that study, we simulated competitions between big lm studio producers
that can decide freely howmuch to invest in their movies. However, in the real motion picture
industry, mini-majors and independent labels also produce and release movies for the same
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market but with substantially smaller budgets (Ainslie, Dréze, & Zufryden, 2005; Gemser,
Van Oostrum, & Leenders, 2007; Zuckerman & Kim, 2003). While big majors such as
Warner Bros. and Universal can invest in very big projects whose budgets can be more than
$200 million (Elberse, 2013), independent studios face signicant budget constraints and
must produce movies with rather small budgets, often less than $10 million. Interestingly,
major Hollywood studios often have two separate divisions for big and small productions.
For example, Universal Pictures runs a subsidiary division, Focus Features, dedicated to
independent movies. The same goes for the 20th Century Fox with Fox Searchlight Pictures,
Warner Bros with New Line Cinema, and Sony with Sony Pictures Classics.2 Thus, in the
motion picture industry head-to-head competitions are not always between big majors, but
can also involve small studios that face signicant budget constraints. The real market o¤ers
abundant support for this kind of competition as well. Examples are Mission: Impossible -
Rogue Nation (produced by Paramount) against Vacation (New Line) or Inside Out (Buena
Vista) against Dope (Open Road Films).
In this third study, we modify our ABM to relax the assumption of unlimited budgets. We
now distinguish between small and big studios, with small studios facing budget constraints
and big studios having the ability to invest unlimited budgets. At each time step, while
big studios invest exactly as before (Equations 5   8), if the investment of a small studio i
overtakes a given budgets cap (i.e., ait + bit > MAX), the studio adjusts its investment in
2 For detailed descriptions of major studios, independent lm producers, their histo-
ries, and their actual relationships, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_lm and
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Major_lm_studio.
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bait and bbit as follows:
bait = MAX  ait
ait + bit
(9)
bbit = MAX  bit
ait + bit
(10)
Notice that such a simple formalization does not hurt the rationale of the decision rules
and preserves the proportions of studiosinvestments in advertising and quality. As for the
positioning, as in Study 2, the studios can also decide how to position their movies using Pi.
5.3.1 A big major against a small studio
Our ABM is now ready to simulate head-to-head competitions between small and big studios.
We simulate the same four scenarios as in the previous study and, without loss of generality,
we let Studio 1 be the small studio and Studio 2 be the big studio. The ABM parameters
are set at their default values. Moreover, we set MAX = N=4, which represents quite a
strong budget constraint as it connes the studiosinvestments to a limit that is four times
less than the total demand of the target segment (N). Later, in the next section, we show
how results change in the case of less stringent constraints, i.e., medium (MAX = N=2) and
weak (MAX = N) constraints.
We report the results of this study in Table 4. First, we compare Table 4 with Table
3 to study how a head-to-head competition against a small studio di¤ers with respect to
one against another big studio. Results show that these two competitions are very di¤erent.
We observe that when competing against a small studio, the most protable scenarios for
the big studio are A and D (37:38 and 48:82, respectively). Conversely, when a big studio
competes against another big studio, the most protable scenarios are B and C (42:13 and
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48:01, respectively).
Second, focusing on the prots of the big studio, we derive another relevant insight:
The big studio should always use the repeat/imitate rule, independent of what the small
studio does. If the small studio uses the repeat/imitate rule (Scenarios A and C), the big
studio earns 37:38 when using the repeat/imitate rule (Scenario A) and only 2:55 when using
the trend rule (Scenario C). But if the small studio uses the repeat/imitate rule (Scenarios
B and D), the big studio should again use the repeat/imitate rule (48:82 in Scenario B)
instead of the trend rule (2:55 in Scenario D). We conclude that the repeat/imitate rule is
always more protable for the big studio. When using this rule, the major studio has rather
high expenditures for advertising and quality (about 40 in total), and it easily conquers
most of the target segment because the small studio has strong budget constraints and its
competitive power is limited.
Third, as for the small studio, results indicate that there are no precise indications of
which decision rule it should use. If the big studio uses the repeat/imitate rule (Scenarios A
and D), then the small studio earns very low prots (9:00 in Scenario A and 5:63 in Scenario
D), and it does not have a precise indication of the most protable rule as these prots are
not statistically di¤erent (F = 1:36, p = :25). On the other hand, if the big studio uses the
trend rule (Scenarios B and C), then the small studio earns high prots (64:95 and 71:98,
respectively), but again prots are rather similar (F = 4:83, p = :03).
Finally, concerning positioning, these results conrm previous results as both the big and
the small studios position their movies rather close to the mainstream when they use the
25
repeat/imitate rule and invest larger budgets, whereas they locate away from the mainstream
only when they can reduce their investments using the trend rule.
Table 4 about here.
To summarize, the results of this study indicate that in head-to-head competitions be-
tween big and small studios, the major studio should lead the market and using a competitor-
oriented strategy such as the repeat/imitate rule. The big studio should invest substantial
budgets in advertising and in quality, and position very close to the mainstream. On the
other hand, the small studio has limited options due to its budget constraints and its prot
largely depends on the decision of the big studio. It should take some distance from the
mainstream only if it reduces its investment considerably by using the trend rule.
5.3.2 Sensitivity to budget constraints
Before moving to the next study, in this section we test how our results change in the case
of less-stringent budget constraints, and then in the next section we also provide additional
details about several robustness checks we have conducted on our ABM. To study how
our results change when varying the budget constraints, we have simulated them at three
di¤erent levels: strong (MAX = N=4), medium (MAX = N=2), and weak (MAX = N).
Notice that when the budget constraints of the small studio become less stringent, we move
from a very uneven competition between a big studio that can invest an unlimited budget
and a small studio that launches very small productions, to a more balanced competition in
which the small studio almost becomes a big studio, facing only mild budget limitations. In
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this sense, this new simulation experiment is a sensitivity analysis that studies the cases in
between Study 2 and Study 3.
Figure 5 illustrates the results. Concerning the small studio, we observe that Scenarios
B and C remain much more protable than Scenarios A and D when the budget constraints
of the small studio become less stringent. This conrms that its prots largely depend on
the decisions of the big studio. Moreover, we observe that, except for Scenario A, the small
studio gains more when it faces stronger budget constraints. This is an interesting result
as it supports the idea of imposing strict budget constraints to produce smaller and more
protable productions. In the discussion section we elaborate more on this and examine
direct managerial implications.
Concerning the big studio, we observe that its prots also change when the small com-
petitor faces di¤erent levels of budget constraints. The prots of the big studio decrease in
Scenarios A, C, and D. This is due to the fact that the major studio faces a more erce com-
petition because the minor competitor can invest more. Only in Scenario B do the prots
of the big studio increase. This is in line with the results of Study 2, in which we found
that Scenario B was protable because the two competing studios signicantly reduced costs
using the trend rule.
Figure 5 about here.
5.3.3 Additional robustness checks
To reinforce the strength of our results, in this section, we illustrate additional robustness
checks that we have conducted on our ABM. We have investigated alternative formalizations
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to model the budget constraints of the small studio. Instead of having a unique budget cap
(MAX) for the investments of the small studio, we have tried distinct caps for advertising
and quality to mimic a situation in which the investments in advertising and quality are
unrelated. We have found that with this alternative formalization as well the small studio
has no strong indications of which decision rule to use and its prots largely depend on the
actions of the big studio.
We have also tested alternative formalizations for the positioning of the big and small
studios. For example, we have tested a market in which the big studio uses xed positioning
on the mainstream P2t = 12 , while the small studio moves on the left side as before, P1t =
0; 1
2

. The rationale for this formalization is that big studios always launch movies for the
average audience because that is the simplest way to address the entire target segment. We
have found that in this case as well results do not qualitatively change.
Finally, as the output of our studies consist of the average outcomes of 100 simulation
runs, to strenghten our results, here we provide evidence that the averages of the runs are
indeed robust outcomes. In Appendix G we study the running means of the 100 simulation
runs of the four scenarios simulated in Study 2, conrming that average results are very ro-
bust, i.e., 100 simulation runs are more than enough to guarantee convergence. An analogous
check was performed with the scenarios of Study 3 and we obtained similar evidence.
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5.4 Study 4: A market with studios using weighted and evolving
decision rules
The two decision rules of our ABM are simple, plausible, and relevant heuristics that studios
use when deciding on their investments. In the previous studies we investigated their prof-
itability and derived interesting insights about their use in a competitive setting. However,
as in any models formalization, they represent a simplied version of the decision-making.
To compare their protability and understand their dynamics, we have imposed that the two
studios use either one of the two, and cannot switch between them. But in reality, studios
often change their strategies. In this last study we implement an evolutionary approach to
investigate a market where studios can use weighted decision rules that change during the
simulation run. Such an approach is very common in ABMs and it has been used to simulate
realistic market dynamics (Palmer et al. 1994; Midgley, Marks, & Cooper, 1997).
In our case, using an evolutionary approach makes our ABMmore realistic as it replicates
a situation in which the studios do not use the same decision rule for the entire simulation
run but instead use a weighted mix of the two rules that can change in time. Moreover,
such a modication allows us to understand in more detail the competing dynamics among
studios. For example, our previous results suggest that the trend rule can be very protable
but only in a scenario in which two competing studios use it together. It is very interesting
to study whether such a scenario would be stable in an evolutionary setting.
To implement the evolutionary approach, we rst extend the competition to more than
two studios. We maintain the same competition setting with head-to-head competitions but,
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instead of simulating a market in which two studios repeatedly compete against each other
at each time step, now many studios can participate. At each time step, two di¤erent studios
are randomly selected and compete against each other in the same competition setting as
before. This modication of the ABM makes our simulations more realistic because in
the real market several big and small studios exist and, most of the time, head-to-head
competitions are between di¤erent studios.
Second, instead of using either the repeat/imitate or the trend rule, studios now can use
weighted decision rules that is, a mix of the repeat/imitate rule and the trend rule. We
dene weighted decision rules as probability vectors:
i = [i (repeat=imitate) ; i (trend)] , (11)
where i (repeat=imitate) is the probability that studio i uses the repeat/imitate rule and
i (trend) is the probability that it uses the trend rule. For example, if studio i uses a
weighted decision rule i = [87%; 13%], it uses the repeat/imitate rule with probability 0:87
and the trend rule with probability 0:13.
5.4.1 Weighted decision rules: protability
We start by simulating a competition with twelve studios: six big studios without budget
constraints (Studios 1   6) and six small studios (Studios 7   12) with budget constraints.
These studios use di¤erent weighted rules as indicated in Table 5 (second column). In
order to obtain a rst indication of their protability, we do not let weighted rules evolve
yet; instead, in this rst simulation experiment we simply study how the di¤erent weighted
decision rules perform. The ABM runs for T = 10; 000 time steps, the ABMs parameters
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are set at their default values, and, as in Study 3, we initially setMAX = N=4 to investigate
the case of strong budget constraints and then we also check the case of less stringent budget
constraints, i.e., medium (MAX = N=2) and weak (MAX = N). In Table 5 we display
results forMAX = N=4, and in Figure 6 we show how the prots change when small studios
have di¤erent budget constraints.
Table 5 about here.
Figure 6 about here.
Table 5 reports the prot of small and big studios that use di¤erent weighted decision rules.
On average, both small and big studios prot more with the repeat/imitate rule than with
the trend rule. The previous studies indicated that the trend rule may be protable because
it can help in calming erce competition and curbing studios investments without losing
viewership. However, at the same time, the trend rule may also be quite unprotable because
if competitors do not follow the same trend, the studio may not invest su¢ ciently and thus
may lose a signicant part of the target segment against them. In this case, it turns out that
using a weighted decision rule with high probability for the trend rule is rather unprotable
because many competitiors use the repeat/imitate rule and keep investing large budgets.
Thus, studios that often use the trend rule lose viewership against these competitors and
prot less.
Table 5 also shows that both small and big studios tend to position their movies toward
the mainstream when they use the repeat/imitate rule. In contrast, when they use the trend
rule, they lower their investments and do not necessarily position their movies close to the
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mainstream, which is in line with our previous results.
Figure 6 illustrates how the prots of the twelve studios change when the small studios
face di¤erent budget constraints. Interestingly, we notice that small studios earn less when
they face weak budget constraints, conrming that imposing strong budget constraints can
be benecial. Moreover, we nd not only that small studios earn less when they have
no budget limitations, but big studios also su¤er. This result conrms that when more
studios produce and launch big productions, then competition becomes more erce and
prots decrease for all studios. Finally, we also observe that the repeat/imitate rule is on
average more protable than the trend rule at any level of budget constraint, which again
conrms the insight illustrated above.
5.4.2 Weighted decision rules: evolution
Now we also investigate what happens when studios modify the weights of their decision rule
during the simulation. The simulation evolves for G = 10 generations, with each generation
running for T = 10; 000 time steps. Thus, in total the simulation runs for T G = 100; 000
time steps. At the beginning of a new generation, big and small studios modify their weighted
decision rules. We indicate the weighted decision rules of big and small studios at generation
g with _biggi and _small
g
i , respectively. Studios modify them as follows:
_biggi =
_bigg 1i + _big
g 1
best_big
2
, (11)
_smallgi =
_smallg 1i + _small
g 1
best_small
2
, (12)
32
where _bigg 1best_big and _small
g 1
best_small are the weighted decision rules of the most suc-
cessful studios in the previous generation, i.e., the big and small studios with the highest
prots g 1iT at generation g 1. As before, we simulate a market with twelve studios, Studios
1   6 are big studios and Studios 7   12 are small studios with budget constraints. They
begin the simulation using the same weighted decision rules indicated in Table 5 (second
column). The ABMs parameters are set at their default values and we again consider the
case of strong (MAX = N=4), medium (MAX = N=2), and weak (MAX = N) budget
constraints.
In Table 6 we report the prots, investments, and positioning of the studios at the end
of the evolution, i.e., last generation g = 10, in the case ofMAX = N=4. First, these results
show that when implementing an evolutionary approach, at the end of the evolution, neither
big nor small studios are signicantly di¤erent, indicating that big and small studios converge
toward similar strategies. Then, we also observe that big studios invest signicantly more
than small studios and that thus such an e¤ort results in higher prots. As for positioning,
we nd that all studios tend to approach the mainstream, but big studios slightly more than
small studios. Overall, these results conrm the insights of the previous experiments, in that
big studios dominate the market by investing large budgets, positioning permanently on the
mainstream, and earning more than small studios.
Figure 7 illustrates how the studios evolve and converge across generations. The graphs
on the left side show the evolution of the weights of the decision rules, whereas the graphs on
the right side plot studiosprots. Then, the graphs above, in the middle, and below refer
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to strong, medium, and weak budget constraints, respectively. With regard to the evolution
of the weights of the decision rules, we observe that when big studios compete against small
studios with strong or medium budget constraints, at the end of the evolution, all studios
converge toward a weighted decision rule that uses the repeat/imitate rule much more than
the trend rule. Big studios converge toward _big = [95%; 5%] in the case of strong budget
constraints and _big = [83%; 17%] in the case of medium constraints. Small studios
instead converge toward _small = [67%; 33%] and _small = [63%; 37%], respectively.
Although the repeat/imitate rule exacerbates the competition by pushing studios toward
higher investments, both big and small studios use this rule because it is the most protable
option. Their prots are not very high, though. In Study 3 we have found that a big studio
that uses the repeat/imitate rule against a small studio earns a prot of about 40, whereas
now at the end of the evolution prots are quite a bit lower, i.e., about 30. This is due to
the fact that in this more realistic setting, big studios do not always compete against small
studios but against other big studios as well. When they compete against small studios they
reap rather high prots, but when they compete against other big studios their prots are
signicantly lower.
As for the prots of small studios, we observe that when they face strong or medium
budget constraints they earn signicantly less than big studios. This is not surprising as
the success of their projects largely depends on the actions of the big studios, which mainly
use the repeat/imitate rule. However, we notice that their prots are not excessively low.
Specically, we nd that they earn more when they are forced to constrain their investments
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within strong budget limitations, which again supports the idea that budget constraints can
indeed be useful tools. In this regard, we observe that on average all studios prot more
when small studios are constrained to strong budget limitations whereas when small studios
are subject to less stringent budget constraints, then the di¤erences between big and small
studios shrink, the competition becomes more erce, and on average studios earn less.
Finally, we notice that when small studios face weak budget constraints meaning that
they can compete with almost similar budgets against big studios all studios use the trend
rule more than the repeat/imitate rule. Big studios converge toward _big = [30%; 70%]
and small studios toward _small = [22%; 78%]. In the case of weak budget constraints,
small studios became almost big studios and they also can launch big productions. Then, in
this case the trend rule becomes more protable and is used more often. This is due to the fact
that competitions between big studios are less erce than competitions between a big and a
small studio. However, further investigation into the output of these simulation experiments
shows that although the studios use the trend rule much more, their investments are still
high, being very similar to the cases of strong and medium budget constraints. Thus, even if
studios use the trend rule more often, this is not enough to substantially reduce investments
and increase prots.
Overall, these results describe a very competitive market in which studios tend to invest
large budgets using a competitor-oriented strategy such as the repeat/imitate rule. They
use this rule in an attempt to beat competitors but they end up earning very little prots.
Table 6 about here.
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Figure 7 about here.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we formalize a strategic competition setting for the launch of new movies.
Our setting reects the head-to-head competition among studios that advertise their up-
coming movies during pre-launch campaigns (Elberse & Anand, 2007). In reality studios
use a variety of decision rules and adopt more sophisticated budget strategies than we used
in our ABM. However, our results explain interesting dynamics behind the scenes of the
competition, in the sense that they indicate the drivers of studiosbehaviors and shed light
on some important aspects of their strategic competition. In this sense, our results o¤er
relevant theoretical and practical implications. In this section we describe the impact of our
contribution, the limitations of our work, and possible future research.
6.1 Strategic launches
Our results indicate that competing big studios would prot more if they used myopic
strategies that ignore the competitor and attenuate their erce competition, such as those
based on the trend rule (Study 1). However, this is not a stable situation because major
studios have an incentive to use the repeat/imitate rule (Study 2). Interestingly, however,
if all studios use the repeat/imitate rule, prots are very low (Studies 2 and 4).
First, these results contribute to explaining why competition in this industry is very
tough and prots are so low. Many studies have suggested that the motion picture industry
is a very risky industry, with the expected prot of the average movie even being negative
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(Eliashberg, Elberse, & Leenders, 2006). In the motion picture industry, studios are well
aware of their competitorsprojects. They plan to launch their best productions in the weeks
of high demand (Epstein, 2010), and know that very likely they will compete head-to-head
against their direct competitors. In this context, studios are strongly tempted to invest
larger budgets in an attempt to gain market share from the direct competitor and to launch
ever-more expensive productions.
Second, our results integrate recent analysis that advocates the so-called blockbuster
strategy (Elberse, 2013). This strategy consists of concentrating all a studios investments
in one or a few productions of very high quality, rather than spreading these budgets more
evenly across other projects; the idea is to enter the market with a huge advertising campaign
that creates a massive event and hopefully a commercial success i.e., a blockbuster. Our
result explains the underlying dynamics of the blockbuster strategy, as it indicates why
studios are so tempted to increase their investments. This is especially advantageous when
competing studios have insu¢ cient means to do the same. In fact, our simulations indicate
that big studios that use a strategy of large investments (repeat/imitate rule) earn more
when they compete against small producers than against big, direct competitors that can
also invest very large budgets. We discuss this more in detail in the next section, where we
review the di¤erences between big and small studios.
Third, our results suggest that protable launches are not only productions of large
investment. Our results indicate a few situations in which small productions can also be
protable. For example, in Studies 3 and 4, we show how small studios can e¢ ciently use
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budget constraints to launch movies that result in higher returns.
6.2 Major and independent studios
The motion picture industry has received lot of attention in the recent marketing literature.
However, only a few works have taken competition into account (Ainslie, Dréze & Zufryden,
2005; Elberse & Eliashberg, 2003), and those that have analyzed competition only at the
level of the movies. Not much has been done on competition among studio producers. To
our knowledge, this is the rst work that investigates how studios compete. In this industry
it is well-known that six major studios dominate the global market in terms of market share.
These are Columbia (Sony), Disney (Buena Vista), Paramount, Fox, Universal, and Warner
Bros. The six major studios are contrasted with a number of smaller production companies
that are known as independents or indies. While big majors usually invest in very big
projects, independent studios face signicant budget constraints and produce movies with
rather small budgets.
First, our results indicate that head-to-head competitions among big majors are rather
di¤erent than head-to-head competitions that include big and small studios. When a big stu-
dio competes against other majors, it prots more when all studios use budget strategies, like
the trend rule, that reduce overall investments. However, that is a rather di¢ cult situation
to achieve because studios can easily use alternative strategies (such as the repeat/imitate
rule) that boost investments without decreasing prots. Moreover, our results indicate that
when big studios compete against small competitors, the majors have even stronger incen-
tives to use the repeat/imitate rule, which means launching big productions. Overall, this
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result testies to the di¢ culties that big studios have when competing in very open markets,
like the motion picture market, where the studios know about what their competitors are
doing, and are constantly tempted to win the competition with higher investments.
Second, with regard to the small studios, we nd that overall budget constraints have a
positive e¤ect on prots. Without such limits, small studios are inclined to spend too much.
Budget caps prevent small studios from investing too much and are particularly useful when
both studios use the repeat/imitate rule, i.e., when they have the tendency to one-up each
other with spending on quality and advertising. Interestingly, in our last study we have
found that big studios obtain larger prots than small studios. However, if we consider the
average ROI of their projects, we nd that the small productions of the minor studios are
more prootable than the large projects of the big majors. This result partially contradicts
the blockbuster strategy (Elberse, 2013) and is very much in line with what we observe in
reality, with big studios creating separate and independent studios with the goal of creating
small productions.
6.3 To mainstream or not to mainstream?
Our ABM and its simulation results o¤er critical managerial suggestions about which kinds
of movies to produce and how to launch them. When major studios compete head-to-head
for the same target segment, they prot more if they launch mainstream movies. When
producing and launching more mainstreammovies, major studios fuel competition by making
their movies more similar and trying to appeal to similar consumers, but they also benet
because they approach the mass market and e¤ectively match the preferences of the target
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segment.
We nd that on average moving toward the average taste of the market is like playing
a safe position, which studios tend to do especially when they invest large budgets (re-
peat/imitate rule). Conversely, studios can explore positions away from the mainstream
when they invest less. For example, we nd that studios take some distance from the main-
stream when they use the trend rule or when they face strong budget constraints that force
them toward small productions. These results are in line with common intuition as big
productions are usually movies that aim to appeal to everyone. However, they also indicate
that other strategies are practical as well, conrming that smaller productions that earn
substantial prots are not uncommon in the motion picture market. Usually these are small
and innovative productions that are quite distant from the mainstream.
In this regard, we acknowledge that how we model a movies positioning is not the only
way one could formalize the mainstream concept. We used a standard Hotelling model, with
the positioning corresponding to a point on the line of possible preferences. But one may
think about alternative formalization as well. For example, one may study the case of when
studios do not choose a point on the target segment, but instead stretch their positioning
to cover a bigger part of the segment. Such a formalization represents an alternative way to
model the mainstream concept because it allows the analysis of movies with wider appeal.
For example, it can capture the idea of groups of customers that have di¤erent preferences
but equally enjoy the movie, or movies with specic features that equally appeal to di¤erent
costumers. Moreover, such an alternative formalization represents an interesting modica-
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tion of the Hotelling model that could be used in other contexts as well. In Appendix C we
examine such an alternative. We obtain results that are very similar to the baseline model,
thus providing additional support for our nding.
6.4 Additional methodological insights
Our work provides interesting methodological insights for the use of ABMs in marketing.
We o¤er a practical example of how to exploit the interplay between an ABM and a game-
theoretical benchmark. The use of ABMs together with analytical models is denitely not
novel. Relevant examples are Brown et al. (2004), and Libai, Muller, and Peres (2005).
These works use both formal analysis and ABMs to investigate interesting extensions of
the analytical model and strengthen their results. Rand and Rust (2011) point out that
the results of analytical modeling, unlike the results of ABM, are generalizable. On the
other hand, analytical modeling often builds in restrictive assumptions, while ABM can
relax many of these assumptions and build a more complex and realistic model. In our
case, using the analytical model allowed us to obtain a signicant benchmark and achieve
generalizability, whereas the ABM helped us investigate interesting extensions of the model
that more realistically adhere to the motion picture industry.
So far in marketing, ABMs have most often been applied to model di¤usion of innovations.
However, according to Rand and Rust (2011), there are several other marketing research
areas with potential for agent-based modeling that should be explored further. In this
paper, we use our ABM to investigate competition. In general, competing rms do not
provide information about their strategies. Neither is it easy to derive that information
41
from aggregate statistics. With our ABMmethodology, we turn the analysis around, starting
with plausible decision rules and then deriving their implications for studios investments
and prots. We nd that very simple but realistic decision rules, such as the repeat/imitate
rule and the trend rule, can generate interesting insights. For example, we show how easily
studios escalate their investments in an attempt to win the competition, and how such a
tendency pushes studios to position their movies closer to the mainstream.
Finally, we also highlight how the interplay between the ABM and the analytical bench-
mark can facilitate analyses and partially validate the ABM. Usually, when running simula-
tions, an ABMmodeler cannot investigate the entire parameter space because computational
resources are invariably limited. Determining the appropriate ranges of the parameters is
an empirical question: The right range is the most realistic one. We used the equilibrium
conditions of the analytical benchmark to align the analytical benchmark and the ABM, and
to guide the validation of our ABM (Appendix E). These equilibrium conditions specied
realistic relationships among some parameters of the model (i.e., , N , , c, and d), so we
ensured realistic movie lifecycle patterns and validated a relevant part of our ABM.
6.5 Limitations and future research
Our competition setting reects solid theoretical assumptions from new product di¤usion
and word-of-mouth literature (Bass, 1969; Godes & Mayzlin, 2009; Mahajan, Muller, &
Kerin, 1984; Neelamegham & Chintagunta, 1999; Peres, Muller, & Mahajan, 2010). As is
true of any abstract setting, it does not account for some other important aspects. Before
concluding this analysis, it is important point out the limitations of this study and suggest
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a few possible extensions that pertain to our model.
First, our competition setting refers to experience products with short life cycles that are
heavily inuenced by pre-launch marketing campaigns. Many experience goods, including
movies, also can display longer life cycles, especially across various technological iterations
(e.g., DVD market, TV rights, merchandising; Hennig-Thurau, Houston, & Heitjans, 2009),
sequential releases in di¤erent markets (Elberse & Eliashberg, 2003; Lehmann & Weinberg,
2000), and potential reinvigoration through advertising. We cannot represent these phenom-
ena because we assume all advertising spending takes place right before the launch (Elberse
& Anand, 2007).
Second, we limited our analysis to a very simple model. Krider and Weinberg (1998)
similarly opt for a parsimonious model with a duopolistic competition in which the studios
choose only the release time of their movies. Also, when specifying the behavioral decision
rules used by the studios, we rely mainly on the behavioral theory of the rm (Greve, 2003a).
However, these rules do not represent a complete set of rm actions. Because the focus of our
research is budget competition and realistic budget decisions, we limited our formalization
to endogenize the budget-related strategic variables of the studios. Further research should
identify other characteristics that mark more extended competition. Possible extensions of
our model might consider other aspects of studiosdecision-making (e.g., when studios are
not risk-neutral; when movies are released sequentially rather than simultaneously; or when
the investment decisions on advertising and quality do not derive from a central division but
from di¤erent o¢ ces that decide at di¤erent times). Moreover, future research could inves-
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tigate the demand side, e.g., how market dynamics change when consumerspreferences are
not uniformly distributed, or when including negative word-of-mouth. These various exten-
sions can help clarify rmschoices of business strategy even further. The ABMmethodology
o¤ers a promising tool for further advances in this direction, though.
Finally, our work opens up future empirical investigation of the motion picture industry.
While most of the marketing literature on this industry has mainly studied the box o¢ ce at
the level of movies, we have focused on the level of studios. Although our ABM is partially
validated with a micro-face validation, still much is needed to empirically ground our setting
into the real motion picture industry. As mentioned above, ultimately, the validation of our
ABM should involve empirical support for its formalization and assumptions, and should
also calibrate the ABMs parameters on the basis of the real behaviors of moviegoers and
studio producers. This empirical validation was beyond the scope of this article though, in
that our main purpose was to study the e¤ects of the ABMs decision rules and compare
them with the analytical benchmark. In the future, other works could use advertising data
and quality instruments to test our competition setting empirically. Moreover, additional
eld evidence could be gathered about how the managers of real studios decide how much
to invest in their productions and thus complement our ABM with additional decision rules.
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Appendix A
Numerical example of moviegoersbehavior and studiosprots. Assume
a cinema market in which  = 0, N = 20, c = 1,  = 1
10
, and studios position their movies at
the extremes of the target segment: P1 = 0 and P2 = 1. Next assume that the two studios
spend equally on advertising and on quality, e.g. a1 = a2 = 4 and b1 = b2 = 9. Consider the
behavior of consumer j = 1, whose taste is on the left side of the target segment, such as
1 = 0:25. At launch, his attraction to Movie 1 is AL11 =
p
4
1+j0:25 0j 0 = 1:6 and attraction to
Movie 2 is AL21 =
p
4
1+j0:75 1j   0 = 1:14. So, he will visit Movie 1 at launch. It follows that for
these values of the cinema market and for these advertising investments of the two studios, at
launch all consumers on the left side of the target segment will visit Movie 1 and all consumers
on the right side of the target segment will visit Movie 2. Thus, half of the consumers visit
Movie 1 and the other half visit Movie 2, such that qL1 = q
L
2 = 10. Now consider Consumer
1s behavior at post-launch. He has already seen Movie 1 at launch, so he will not consider
that movie at post-launch. His attraction to Movie 2 is APL21 =
1
10
p910
1+j0:75 1j   0 = 1:71. So,
Consumer 1 will visit Movie 2 at post-launch. It follows that at post-launch, all consumers on
the left side of the target segment will visit Movie 2 and all consumers on the right side of the
target segment will visit Movie 1. Then, post-launch viewerships will be qPL1 = q
PL
2 = 10,
and cumulative viewerships qCUM1 = q
CUM
2 = 10 + 10 = 20. Finally, prots immediately
derive from viewerships: 1t = 2t = 20  (4 + 9) = 7.
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Appendix B
Proof. Consider the game version of the model described in Section 2 (Equations 1   4).
In this simple, two-period game, launch is the rst period, and post-launch is the second.
From Equation 1, we determine the type of consumer L who is indi¤erent about seeing the
two movies at launch,
L =
p
a1 (c+ P2) pa2(c  P1)p
a1 +
p
a2
, (B1)
such that all consumers whose preferences are to the left of L see Movie 1, and all those
whose preferences are to the right see Movie 2. Therefore,
(qL1 ; q
L
2 ) = (N
L; N(1  L)). (B2)
From Equation 2, we also know the type of consumer PL1 that has not seen Movie 1 at
launch and who is indi¤erent about seeing or not seeing it at post-launch,
PL1 =
NL
p
b1   (c  P1)

. (B3)
Equivalently, for Movie 2 we have
PL2 =
N
 
1  Lpb2   (c  P2)

, (B4)
such that the cumulative viewership for Movies 1 and 2 are
(qCUM1 ; q
CUM
2 ) = (q
L
1 + q
PL
1 ; q
L
2 + q
PL
2 ) = (N
PL
1 ); N(1  PL2 )). (B5)
Now consider the problem faced by Studio 1. According to Equations B1, B3, and B5,
Studio 1s prot function can be rewritten as
max
a1;b1
N
h
N
p
b1
p
a1(c+P2) pa2(c P1)p
a1+
p
a2

  (c  P1)
i

  (a1 + b1). (B6)
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Studio 1 thus chooses a1 and b1 to maximize its prots. The rst-order conditions are:
a1 : N
2
p
b1
 
1
2
1p
a1
 (c+ P2)
 p
a1 +
p
a2
  1
2
1p
a1

p
a1 (c+ P2) pa2(c  P1)

2
 p
a1 +
p
a2
2
!
= 1,
(B7)
and
b1 : N
2
"p
a1 (c+ P2) pa2(c  P1)

 p
a1 +
p
a2
 # 1
2
1p
b1
= 1. (B8)
Equations B7 and B8 implicitly dene the best response functions for Studio 1. Because we
focus on a symmetric model, we impose a1 = a2 = ae, b1 = b2 = be. Solving Equations B7
and B8, we obtain
ae = (c+ d)

N2
4
2
, and (B9)
be =

N2
4
2
. (B10)
In turn, we obtain
L =
1
2
, (B11)
PL1 =
N32
82
 

c+ d  1
2

, (B12)
PL2 =
N32
82
 

c+ d+
1
2

, and (B13)
the equilibrium prots
e = (1  c  d)

N2
4
2
+N

1
2
  c  d

. (B14)
As a last step, we specify the conditions of the equilibrium and therefore issue the following
corollary.
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Corollary 1 The SNE in Proposition 1 exists when the following conditions and the corre-
sponding restrictions over the parameters are satised:
CONDITION 1. Full coverage of the market occurs at launch (period 1). To obtain full
market coverage at launch we impose that, if d 6 1
4
, the consumer with preference 0 visits
Movie 1. Otherwise, the consumer with preference  1
2
visits Movie 1.8><>:
p
ae
c+j0 P1j >  )
p
(c+d)x
c+j0 P1j >  )  >
42(c+ 12 d)
N2
p
c+d
, if d 6 1
4p
ae
c+j 1
2
 P1j >  )
p
(c+d)x
c+j 1
2
 P1j >  )  >
42
p
c+d
N2
, if d > 1
4
.
(B15)
CONDITION 2. There exist at least some consumers who attend movies at post-launch
(period 2). Because L = 1
2
(Equation B11) and we have imposed full market coverage at
launch, we can conclude that at launch all consumers with preferences i < 12 visit Movie
1, and all consumers with preferences i < 12 visit Movie 2. As 
PL
1 has not seen Movie 1
at launch and is indi¤erent about seeing or not seeing it at post-launch, to obtain positive
viewership at post-launch, we can impose PL1 >
1
2
. Then we have
PL1 >
1
2
) N
L
1
p
x  (c  P1)

>
1
2
)  >
r
82(c+ d)
N3
. (B16)
CONDITION 3. At the end of the post-launch (period 2), not all consumers have seen all
movies. Following the same line of reasoning as in condition 2, we impose PL1  1. Then
we obtain
PL1  1)
NL1
p
x  (c  P1)

 1)  
s
82(c+ d+ 1
2
)
N3
. (B17)
54
Appendix C
In this Appendix we propose an alternative formalization of the movies positioning.
Rather than assuming that movies correspond to points on the Hotelling line, we allow for
the possibility that studios launch movies that cover an entire portion of the target segment.
Such an alternative formalization captures the idea that a movie with a larger segment
is more mainstream because it covers more market preferences and thus appeals to more
moviegoers. Obviously studios compete by deciding the length of their segment and incur
additional costs when launching movies that cover longer segments. Here we aim to provide
a simple extension along this line of reasoning, avoiding the technicalities of a full-edged
analysis, which is beyond the scope of the current paper. We consider a simple case in which
studios release movies anchored at the extremes of the segment, in 0 and 1, and decide how
much to stretch from these two extremes toward the center of the Hotelling line. Figure C1
provides a graphical representation.
Figure C1 about here.
Let  1 = [0; P1]  [0; 1] be the segment of Movie 1, and  2 = [P2; 1]  [0; 1] the segment
of Movie 2. By enlarging the segment a movie becomes more appealing to the population of
moviegoers according to the following reasoning: all the consumers whose type  lies in the
segment of characteristics  i obtain the greatest utility from movie i; if instead the type  is
not in the segment  i, its utility decreases according to the distance between the consumers
type and the closest characteristic of the movie in the segment  i. Formally speaking, dene
the distance between j and movie is segment of characteristics as
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dij =
8>><>>:
0, if  2  i;
j j   Pi j , if  62  i.
(C1)
The distance dij a¤ects the attraction of movie i at launch, and similarly to our baseline
model, consumer j visits the movie with the highest positive attraction, provided that it
obtains a utility that is bigger than the outside good. Then, at post-launch, consumer j
decides whether to visit the other movie or not. All the other elements of the model are
unchanged, therefore we can model the utilities as follows:
ULij =
p
ai
c+ dij
, (C2)
UPLij =
WOMi
c+ dij
=
 qLi Qi
c+ dij
. (C3)
Finally, assuming that there is an increasing cost to having a longer segment of charac-
teristics, we measure, for example, Studio 1s performance as the di¤erence between the
cumulative viewership and the total investments, with
1 = q
CUM
1   (a1 + b1 + C(P1)), (C4)
C 0 > 0, C 00 > 0. To make the comparison with the baseline model, consider the case of when
the moviescharacteristics do not overlap, such that P1 < P2. From Equation C2, we can
determine the type of consumer L who is indi¤erent about seeing the two movies at launch,
L =
p
a1 (c+ P2) pa2(c  P1)p
a1 +
p
a2
, (C5)
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such that all consumers whose preferences are to the left of L see Movie 1, and all those
whose preferences are to the right see Movie 2. Therefore, as in the baseline model,
(qL1 ; q
L
2 ) = (N
L; N(1  L)). (C6)
From Equation C3, we also know the type of consumer PL1 who has not seen Movie 1 at
launch and who is indi¤erent about seeing or not seeing it at post-launch,
PL1 =
NL
p
b1   (c  P1)

, (C7)
such that the cumulative viewership for Movie 1 is
qCUM1 = q
L
1 + q
PL
1 = N
PL
1 . (C8)
Now consider the problem faced by Studio 1. If we assume that the studio incurs greater
costs when increasing the size of the segment  1, according to Equations C4, C5, and C7,
its prots can be rewritten as
N
h
N
p
b1
p
a1(c+P2) pa2(c P1)p
a1+
p
a2

  (c  P1)
i

  (a1 + b1 + C(P1)), (C9)
and Studio 2s prots will correspond to a similar expression. Thus, in the simple case in
which the studios position their movies at the extremes and then compete choosing segments,
we obtain a setting that is very similar to the baseline model. If we assume that the studios
choose not only their budgets, but also the length of the segment of their movies, when
maximizing its prots Studio 1 chooses a1 and b1 according to Equations B7 and B8, whereas
P1 is
P1 : N
h
N
p
b1
p
a2p
a1+
p
a2
+ 
i

= C 0(P1). (C10)
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After imposing symmetry, we get
P1 : N
h
N

N2
4

1
2
+ 
i

= C 0(P1) = N + 2

N2
4
2
= N + 2x = C 0(P1). (C11)
Finally, considering the case of quadratic costs, C(P1) = (P1)2, being  > 0 a parameter
that determines the costs of producing a more mainstream movie, we get the closed-form
solution
P e =
N + 2x
2
. (C12)
Example. It is possible to provide conditions such that, in equilibrium, the two
studios o¤er movies for totally distinct segments,  1 \  2 = ? (see Figure C1). This would
be the case if
P e =
N + 2x
2
=
N + 2

N2
4
2
2
<
1
2
. (C13)
Using the same numerical values of Table 1 and assuming that  = 150, Studio 1 would
choose a value
P e =
100 + 2
 p
6
1003
1002
4
2
300
=
1
3
+
1
4  1003 <
1
2
. (C14)
Here we conveniently set  = 150 to obtain a numerical solution that is consistent with
the setting of the other parameters. Eventually, as with the other parameters of the model,
also  should be empirically validated.
First, we note that in this setting the close-form solutions are very similar to the baseline
model, as the values of ae and be do not change. Moreover, we are able to obtain a close-form
solution for the positioning that intuitively makes sense: P e depends positively on N and 
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(studios make a more mainstream movie when the target segment is larger and the word-
of-mouth e¤ect is stronger), and negatively on  (studios make a less mainstream movie
when the other means of leisure and the cost of making a more mainstream movie increase).
Because this new setting represents an alternative way to model the mainstream concept
and its results are very similar to the baseline model, we conclude that these results provide
additional support for our nding.
Second, we highlight the di¢ culties that this new formalization entailed, both analytically
and with the ABM. Analytically, the more general case of when the studios choose the length
of the segments  1 and  2 without starting from the extremes of the Hotelling segment
implies a much greater computational cost. For example, just focusing on the derivation
of the demand functions at launch, we should account for the following di¤erent cases for
the consumers type :  2  1 \  2;  2  1 and  62  2;  2  2 and  62  1;  62  1 [  2.
Considering then the derivation of the demand in the post-launch corresponding to the
di¤erent cases of the demand at launch, the general analysis when studios compete using
segments would generate a large number of cases to be studied, each case leading to di¤erent
equilibria. On the other hand, concerning the ABM, this formalization is certainly easier to
implement. However, this formalization must assume a cost structure () that is inherently
di¢ cult to validate. It is reasonable to assume that a movie that covers a larger portion of
the Hotelling line has higher costs. But such a cost would be di¢ cult to validate empirically.
A movie that covers a larger portion of the Hotelling line indicates a movie that, paying a
higher cost, meets more preferences. A movie can aim at meeting a large base of preferences
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by covering more genres, or by proposing a story-plot for di¤erent people, etc. In principle,
these costs may be measurable, but their identication could be rather di¢ cult.
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Appendix D
Numerical example for the repeat/imitate rule. According to Equation 5, the
focal studio repeats its investments in advertising and in quality if it earns more than or the
same as the competitor, and copies the competitor otherwise. When it copies the competitor
it increases the investment if the competitor invests more, and it decreases it if the competitor
invests less. Assume a cinema market in which N = 100. At time step t 1 Studio 1 invested
a1t 1 = 40 in advertising and b1t 1 = 40 in quality, obtaining prots 1t 1 = 12, whereas
Studio 2 invested a1t 1 = 45 and b1t 1 = 30 obtaining 2t 1 = 15. How do the two studios
change their budget investments at the next time step t when using the repeat/imitation
rule? As Studio 2 proted more than Studio 1, it repeats its budget choices such that
a2t = a2t 1 = 40 and b2t = b2t 1 = 30. In contrast, as Studio 1 proted less, it copies
Studio 2, decreasing its investment in advertising and increasing its investment in quality as
follows: a1t = 45
 
1  45 40
100

= 42:75 and b1t = 30
 
1  30 40
100

= 33. In this example, Studio
1 observes that it is faring worse than its competitor. While Studio 2 repeats its budget
choices, Studio 1 imitates decreasing investment in advertising and increasing quality.
Numerical example for the trend rule. Assume that at time step t 2, Studio 1
invested a1t 2 = 5 and b1t 2 = 10, gaining 1t 2 = 7 and that at time step t  1, it increased
both advertising and quality to a1t 1 = 6 and b1t 1 = 11, resulting in less prot, 1t 1 = 6.
How much does it increase or decrease its budget investment in the next time step t when
using the trend rule? As prots decreased, 1t 1 < 1t 2, substituting in Equations 7 and 8,
we obtain a1t = 6
 
1  6 5
5

= 4:8 and b1t = 11
 
1  11 10
10

= 9:9. This means that at time
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step t, Studio 1 decides to decrease advertising investment by 20% and quality investment
by 10%. In this example, Studio 1 observes that in the previous time step it obtained lower
prots after increasing investment in advertising and quality. Then, it decides to switch the
trend and decrease investments in both advertising and quality.
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Appendix E
In this appendix we rst provide empirical evidence for the conceptual framework of
head-to-head competition. Then, we o¤er detailed justication for the design choices of the
ABM, and a validation for the setting of the ABMs parameters. Finally we include a section
about the ABMs verication.
Empirical evidence of head-to-head competition. As mentioned above, head-
to-head competition is very common in the motion picture industry (Epstein, 2010; Krider
& Weinberg, 1998). To empirically support our duopolistic competition setting, we collect
data on moviesreleases in the North American market. Our data include the yearly top 150
motion pictures in terms of sales released in the U.S./Canadian market, from 1999 to 2011.3
We focus on the release date. Figure E1 reports how many times (i) no movies released; (ii)
a movie released alone; (iii) two movies launched on the same date and competed head-to-
head; (iv) three movies released on the same date; and (v) more than three movies released
on the same date.4 These frequencies show that when studios release their movies, a head-
to-head competition is the most common setting, conrming that head-to-head competition
is extremely common in the motion picture industry. Obviously, a studio does not always
compete against the same competitor. Head-to-head competitions are among the six big
majors (Columbia, Disney, Paramount, 20th Century Fox, Universal, and Warner Bros.), so
3 These data e¤ectively cover almost the entire market by accounting for more than 95% of total box
o¢ ce sales. Source: www.boxo¢ cemojo.com.
4 In the North American motion picture market, almost all movies release on Friday. These statistics
include releases from major studios, mini-majors, and independent labels. For a classication of the studio
producers in North America, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Major_lm_studio.
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they indeed rematch often. In Study 4, we also take this aspect into account, simulating a
market with more than two competitors.
Figure E1 about here.
The design choices of our ABM. We have prepared a summary that describes
the design choices of our ABM based on the Rand and Rust (2011) guidelines. In Table E1,
we illustrate the scope of the model, the types of agents in the simulation, their properties
and behaviors, the environment, input and output of the ABM, and nally we present a
short description of the order of the events in the time step of the simulation run.
Table E1 about here.
Validation. In this section we summarize how we validate our ABM and the initial-
ization of the ABMs parameters. Rand and Rust (2011) dene validation as the process of
determining how well the implemented model corresponds to reality, and distinguish among
micro-face, macro-face, empirical input, and empirical output validation. Micro- and macro-
face validations ensure that the micro mechanisms of the agents and the macro patterns of
the model correspond on their face to the real world. Empirical input and output vali-
dations use real data to validate the ABM. The empirical input validation ensures that the
data being put into the ABM are accurate and correspond to the real world, whereas the
empirical output validation conrms that the output of the implemented model corresponds
to the real world. Ultimately, the validation of our ABM should involve empirical support
for its formalization and assumptions, and should also calibrate the ABMs parameters on
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the basis of the real behaviors of moviegoers and studio producers. This empirical validation
is beyond the scope of this article, though, in that our main purpose is to study the e¤ects of
the ABMs decision rules and compare them with the analytical benchmark. Nevertheless,
in order to demonstrate that our ABM is properly grounded in the real market of the mo-
tion picture industry, we have provided empirical evidence for the head-to-head competition
framework in the previous section and in this section we set the ABM parameters based on
a micro-face validation.
We choose the following default values:  = 1, N = 100, j  U[0;1], c = 0:25, d = 0:25,
and  =
q
6
1003
. Although this setting is not totally empirically driven, we maintain that
these values realistically reect the motion picture market and represent a solid validation
of our ABM. The parameters , N , j, c, d, and  are micro-face validated, as their values
correspond in a meaningful way to the characteristics of the real market (Rand & Rust,
2011).
Without loss of generality, we set  = 1, assuming that the attraction of other means
of leisure is constant and does not vary in time. Then, to exclude unjustied holes in the
distribution of consumerspreferences, we set N = 100 and j  U[0;1]. We use a uniform
distribution to refer to the most general case where consumerspreferences for movie types
are equally likely. The parameter c is set at 0:25, which corresponds to the middle point
between the maximum utility (i.e., the consumers preference perfectly matches the closest
movie type, jj   Pij = 0) and the minimum utility (i.e., the consumers preference is furthest
from the closest movie type, jj   Pij = 0:5). Also the distance of the movies from the
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mainstream is initially set to its middle point, d = 0:25, between the minimum, where both
studios locate exactly in the mainstream (d = 0, i.e. P1 = P2 = 0:5), and the maximum,
where the studios locate their movies at the extremes of the target segment (d = 0:5, i.e.
P1 = 0 and P2 = 1).
Finally, we set  =
q
6
1003
. To set this parameter we use the cross-validation technique.
Cross-validation is a kind of empirical output validation that compares one model against
another model that has already been validated (Rand & Rust, 2011). In our case, we
use the three equilibrium conditions of the fully rational benchmark that are realistic and,
given the parametersvalues of above, constrain  to fall between
q
8
1003
and
q
4
1003
. The
three conditions of the fully rational benchmark ensure that in equilibrium, three realistic
macro patterns are satised: (a) the target segment is fully covered at launch (condition
1), (b) there exist some consumers who visit the movie in the post-launch (condition 2),
and (c) at the end of the post-launch not all consumers have seen all movies (condition 3).
Constraining the value of  such that the three equilibrium conditions are satised provides
a macro-face validation because these three conditions are well in line with extant evidence
about movieslife cycles: (a) peaks of demand are usually well-captured by the launch of new
movies (Epstein, 2010); (b) viewership decays quite rapidly after launch, but post-launch
viewership determines a relevant part of total sales (Elberse & Eliashberg, 2003; Jedidi,
Krider, & Weinberg, 1998; Lehmann & Weinberg, 2000); and (c) consumers who choose
among the newly released movies do not necessarily visit the others in the post-launch
period.
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Verication. To ensure that the ABM does what it is supposed to do and that
the implemented model corresponds to the conceptual model, we verify our ABM based on
the Rand and Rust (2011) guidelines. We use three di¤erent tools: (i) documentation, (ii)
programmatic testing, and (iii) test cases. The documentation of our ABM provides the
MATLAB code and an input le. These are available on request from the corresponding
author. As for the programmatic tests, we programmed several check tests to guarantee that
the simulation run does not generate unexpected outputs. Finally, we simulate a few extreme
test cases to ensure that the ABM replicates easy and intuitive predictions. For instance,
we verify what happens if two studios launch movies with exactly the same advertising and
quality investments and symmetrical positioning. As expected, we nd that market shares
are similar.
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Appendix F
In this appendix we illustrate how to relax the assumption of symmetric positioning. We
extend the two decision rules such that studios also decide on how to position their movies
Pi. The updating of Pi follows the same rationale as for ai and bi. Studios decide to launch
more- or less mainstream movies by repeating their previous choices or copying from their
competitor; alternatively, they can follow recent protable positioning trends. Here below
we present the formal updating for Pi.
The repeat/imitate rule. Studio i updates its positioning by comparing its own
prot against the competitors prot:
Pit =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
if it 1   it 1 or Pit 1 = P it 1 then Pit 1;
if it 1 <  it 1 and
1
2
  Pit 1
 > 1
2
  P it 1
 then i moves toward the mainstream;
if it 1 <  it 1 and
1
2
  Pit 1
 < 1
2
  P it 1
 then i moves away from the mainstream.
(F32)
Studio 1 moves towards the mainstream by P1t = P1t 1 + !
 
1
2
  P1t 1

, and away from
the mainstream by P1t = P1t 1   !P1t 1. Instead, Studio 2 moves toward the mainstream
by P2t 1   !
 
P2t 1   12

, and away from the mainstream by P2t 1 + ! (1  P2t 1). Here !
is a parameter that determines how much the studios change Pi from time step t   1 to
time step t. In our simulations, ! is a random number drawn from a uniform distribution:
!  U[0;1]. To understand the rationale behind this rule, recall that in our ABM Studio 1
moves on the left side of the target segment, i.e., P1t = [0; 0:5], and Studio 2 on the right
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side, i.e., P2t = [0:5; 1], and consider the following example: Assume that at time step t  1,
P1t 1 = 0:4, P2t 1 = 0:9, and it 1 < 2t 1. This means that at time step t   1, the movie
of Studio 1 is more mainstream and less protable than the movie of Studio 2. Thus, at
time step t, Studio 1 copies Studio 2 and moves away from the mainstream. Assuming that
! = 0:3, P1t = P1t 1 !P1t 1 = 0:4 0:30:4 = 0:28. In contrast, as the movie of Studio 2 is
more protable than the movie of Studio 1, Studio 2 simply repeats its previous movement:
P2t = P2t 1 = 0:9.
The trend rule. Studio i decides its positioning as follows:
Pit =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
if it 1 = it 2 or Pit 1 = Pit 2 then Pit 1;
if it 1 > it 2 and
1
2
  Pit 1
 > 1
2
  Pit 2
 then i moves away from the mainstream;
if it 1 > it 2 and
1
2
  Pit 1
 < 1
2
  Pit 2
 then i moves toward the mainstream;
if it 1 < it 2 and
1
2
  Pit 1
 > 1
2
  Pit 2
 then i moves toward the mainstream;
if it 1 < it 2 and
1
2
  Pit 1
 < 1
2
  Pit 2
 then i moves away from the mainstream.
(F33)
The movements of the two studios toward and away from the mainstream are the same:
Studio 1 moves toward the mainstream by P1t = P1t 1 + !
 
1
2
  P1t 1

, and away from the
mainstream by P1t = P1t 1   !P1t 1. Instead, Studio 2 moves toward the mainstream by
P2t 1   !
 
P2t 1   12

, and away from the mainstream by P2t 1 + ! (1  P2t 1).
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Appendix G
In this last appendix, we study the running means of a studios prots to provide evidence
that average results indeed reect convergence. This is important because in all our studies
we replicated each simulation scenario for 100 runs. Moreover, results indicate that the
outputs of di¤erent runs can be rather di¤erent. For example, in Studies 2 and 3 (Table
3 and Table 4), especially when the studios use the trend rule, we observe that standard
deviations can be rather high, indicating that single runs can di¤er a lot. The plots of Figure
G1 display the running means of the small and big studiosprots in the four scenarios of
Study 3. They conrm that average results are very robust, i.e., 100 simulation runs are
more than enough to guarantee convergence. We have also conducted additional checks
on the running means of the studiosinvestments in advertising and quality and obtained
similar indications.
Figure G1 about here.
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Table 1. The parameters of the ABM 
Parameter Name Default value 
Validation 
(Rand and Rust, 
2011) 
Rationale 
N Number of consumers 100 
Micro-face 
validation 
We simulate a sufficiently high number of consumers to obtain enough variety 
in consumers’ preferences. 
θj 
Consumers’ 
preferences U[0,1] 
Micro-face 
validation 
We refer to the most general case where consumers’ preferences for movie 
types are equally likely. 
γ 
Other means of 
leisure, i.e. 
outside good 
1 Micro-face validation 
We normalize it to 1 assuming other means of leisure do not vary in time. No 
loss of generality. 
c 
Practical 
constrains of 
movie 
consumption 
.25 Micro-face validation 
We refer to the general case where the practical constraints of the movie 
fruition lays in the middle between the highest and the lowest utility the agent 
can obtain from the fruition of a movie. 
d 
Movie’s 
differentiation .25 
Micro-face 
validation and 
sensitivity analysis 
With symmetric positioning the two competing studios launch movies that are 
equidistant from the average consumer, i.e. P1=0.5-d and P2=0.5+d. Setting 
d=.25 we study the middle case. Then, varying d, we study the case of more- or 
less-mainstream movies (Study 1). Finally, in Studies 2, 3 and 4 we study 
asymmetric positioning. 
δ WOM’s persuasiveness �
61003 Empirical output validation (cross-validation) We validate this value based on the three equilibrium conditions of the analytical benchmark. 
Notes: In Appendix E we provide a more detailed description of the setting of the ABM’s parameters. 
Table
Table 2. Symmetric competition 
  Profit 
Investment in 
advertising 
Investment in 
quality 
Analytical 
benchmark   18.75 18.75 37.50 
Scenario A Both studios use the repeat or imitate rule 
-9.61 
(27.36) 
44.43 
(25.91) 
35.51 
(21.38) 
Scenario B Both studios use the trend rule 
40.31 
(30.80) 
3.56 
(3.89) 
6.31 
(13.69) 
F statistics  146.83* 243.35* 132.24* 
Notes: Profit is 𝜋𝜋�1𝑇𝑇, investment in advertising is 𝑎𝑎�1𝑇𝑇, and investment in quality is 𝑏𝑏�1𝑇𝑇,; F 
statistics refer to ANOVA tests comparing the means of the 100 simulation runs among 
scenarios; SD are in parenthesis; *p<.01. 
Table
Table 3. Asymmetric competition 
  Profit Investment in advertising 
Investment 
in quality 
Distance 
from 
mainstream 
Scenario A Both studios use the repeat or imitate rule 
7.60 
(27.41) 
41.12 
(22.97) 
29.22 
(13.01) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
Scenario B Both studios use the trend rule 
42.13 
(30.48) 
2.92 
(3.93) 
3.83 
(12.76) 
0.24 
(0.18) 
Scenario C 
Studio 1 uses the repeat or 
imitate rule whereas 
Studio 2 uses the trend 
rule 
48.01 
(19.41) 
30.25 
(15.60) 
19.67 
(13.58) 
0.14 
(0.14) 
Scenario D 
Studio 1 uses the trend 
rule whereas Studio 2 uses 
the repeat or imitate rule 
-0.82 
(5.35) 
1.52 
(3.14) 
1.16 
(0.35) 
0.25 
(0.24) 
F statistics  114.40* 197.50* 137.10* 24.09* 
Notes: Profit is 𝜋𝜋�1𝑇𝑇, investment in advertising is 𝑎𝑎�1𝑇𝑇, investment in quality is 𝑏𝑏�1𝑇𝑇, and 
distance from mainstream is ?̅?𝑑1𝑇𝑇 = |1/2 − 𝑃𝑃�1𝑇𝑇|; F statistics refer to ANOVA tests comparing 
the means of the 100 simulation runs among scenarios; SD are in parenthesis; *p<.01. 
Table
Table 4. Head-to-head competition between a small and a big studio 
  
Profit 
(small 
studio) 
Investment in 
advertising 
(small studio) 
Investment in 
quality 
(small studio) 
Distance from 
mainstream 
(small studio) 
Profit 
(big 
studio) 
Investment in 
advertising 
(big studio) 
Investment in 
quality 
(big studio) 
Distance from 
mainstream 
(big studio) 
Scenario A 
Both the small and the 
big studio use the 
repeat or imitate rule 
9.00 
(23.18) 
13.65 
(6.37) 
10.88 
(6.58) 
0.13 
(0.06) 
37.38 
(16.26) 
21.47 
(8.89) 
19.18 
(15.30) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
Scenario B 
Both the small and the 
big studio use the 
trend rule 
64.95 
(25.54) 
6.42 
(6.06) 
7.62 
(7.48) 
0.16 
(0.16) 
15.93 
(31.59) 
3.96 
(10.85) 
5.18 
(23.57) 
0.19 
(0.20) 
Scenario C 
The small studio uses 
the repeat or imitate 
rule and the big studio 
uses the trend rule 
71.98 
(17.83) 
12.20 
(6.97) 
8.32 
(6.59) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
2.55 
(10.14) 
4.06 
(12.00) 
3.90 
(13.11) 
0.23 
(0.23) 
Scenario D 
The small studio uses 
the trend rule and the 
big studio uses the 
repeat or imitate rule 
5.63 
(17.23) 
7.00 
(7.14) 
4.62 
(5.14) 
0.17 
(0.19) 
48.82 
(19.09) 
23.87 
(13.36) 
16.34 
(10.22) 
0.09 
(0.10) 
F statistics  270.78* 30.04* 15.68* 4.46* 100.35* 90.17* 22.47* 20.43* 
Notes: Results refer to a competition in which small studios face strong budget constraints, i.e., 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑁/4; profit is 𝜋𝜋�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, investment in 
advertising is 𝑎𝑎�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, investment in quality is 𝑏𝑏�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and distance from mainstream is ?̅?𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = |1/2 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|; F statistics refer to ANOVA tests 
comparing the means of the 100 simulation runs among scenarios; SD are in parenthesis; *p<.01. 
Table
Table 5. Competition with more than two studios and weighted decision rules 
  Profit Investment in advertising 
Investment 
in quality Positioning 
Big studios 
Studio 1 using [0%, 100%] 1.67 (7.23) 
9.85 
(25.56) 
2.65 
(6.32) 
0.22 
(0.18) 
Studio 2 using [20%, 80%] 18.05 (13.39) 
14.68 
(12.19) 
5.04 
(5.34) 
0.19 
(0.08) 
Studio 3 using [40%, 60%] 29.10 (9.79) 
30.21 
(9.75) 
9.20 
(7.74) 
0.10 
(0.05) 
Studio 4 using [60%, 40%] 30.65 (9.09) 
33.88 
(10.86) 
10.09 
(8.03) 
0.09 
(0.03) 
Studio 5 using [80%, 20%] 31.26 (8.86) 
34.88 
(12.00) 
10.47 
(8.12) 
0.08 
(0.03) 
Studio 6 using [100%, 0%] 32.40 (9.77) 
35.58 
(12.09) 
10.64 
(8.20) 
0.07 
(0.03) 
F statistics  149.49* 58.86* 20.07* 56.29* 
      
Small 
studios 
Studio 7 using [0%, 100%] 14.24 (10.76) 
9.32 
(9.37) 
1.66 
(1.87) 
0.21 
(0.14) 
Studio 8 using [20%, 80%] 20.58 (10.44) 
14.77 
(9.44) 
2.56 
(2.15) 
0.19 
(0.06) 
Studio 9 using [40%, 60%] 27.52 (5.10) 
20.02 
(3.51) 
3.47 
(3.12) 
0.14 
(0.03) 
Studio 10 using [60%, 40%] 26.72 (5.05) 
20.36 
(3.34) 
3.54 
(3.41) 
0.13 
(0.02) 
Studio 11 using [80%, 20%] 27.15 (4.62) 
20.46 
(3.27) 
3.61 
(3.50) 
0.12 
(0.02) 
Studio 12 using [100%, 0%] 27.55 (4.56) 
20.53 
(3.23) 
3.63 
(3.56) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
F statistics  56.25* 70.05* 7.17* 41.40* 
Notes: Results refer to a competition in which small studios face strong budget constraints, 
i.e., 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑁/4; profit is 𝜋𝜋�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, investment in advertising is 𝑎𝑎�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, investment in quality is 𝑏𝑏�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
and distance from mainstream is ?̅?𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = |1/2 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|; F statistics refer to ANOVA tests 
comparing the means of the 100 simulation runs among big or small studios; SD are in 
parenthesis; *p<.01. 
Table
Table 6. Competition with weighted decision rules that evolve 
  Profit Investment in advertising 
Investment 
in quality Positioning 
Big studios 
Studio 1 starting the evolution 
with [0%, 100%] 
25.42 
(10.56) 
34.44 
(10.14) 
17.63 
(8.16) 
.07 
(.03) 
Studio 2 starting the evolution 
with [20%, 80%] 
24.67 
(9.82) 
34.59 
(10.85) 
17.63 
(8.07) 
.08 
(.03) 
Studio 3 starting the evolution 
with [40%, 60%] 
25.10 
(10.22) 
34.33 
(10.53) 
17.58 
(8.13) 
.08 
(.03) 
Studio 4 starting the evolution 
with [60%, 40%] 
26.27 
(10.42) 
34.73 
(9.96) 
17.62 
(7.96) 
.07 
(.03) 
Studio 5 starting the evolution 
with [80%, 20%] 
26.13 
(9.80) 
34.80 
(10.14) 
17.60 
(8.08) 
.07 
(.03) 
Studio 6 starting the evolution 
with [100%, 0%] 
25.52 
(9.67) 
34.59 
(10.21) 
17.53 
(7.88) 
.07 
(.03) 
F statistics  .36 .03 .04 .57 
      
Small 
studios 
Studio 7 starting the evolution 
with [0%, 100%] 
9.83 
(5.29) 
19.04 
(3.86) 
5.30 
(4.17) 
.13 
(.02) 
Studio 8 starting the evolution 
with [20%, 80%] 
9.73 
(5.40) 
19.01 
(3.88) 
5.30 
(4.15) 
.14 
(.02) 
Studio 9 starting the evolution 
with [40%, 60%] 
9.91 
(5.37) 
19.04 
(3.87) 
5.30 
(4.17) 
.13 
(.02) 
Studio 10 starting the evolution 
with [60%, 40%] 
10.18 
(5.34) 
19.03 
(3.87) 
5.28 
(4.15) 
.13 
(.02) 
Studio 11 starting the evolution 
with [80%, 20%] 
10.12 
(5.39) 
19.04 
(3.87) 
5.29 
(4.18) 
.13 
(.02) 
Studio 12 starting the evolution 
with [100%, 0%] 
10.24 
(5.44) 
19.03 
(3.87) 
5.27 
(4.15) 
.13 
(.02) 
F statistics  .15 .00 .00 .14 
Notes: Results refer to a competition in which small studios face strong budget constraints, 
i.e., 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑁/4; profit is 𝜋𝜋�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, investment in advertising is 𝑎𝑎�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, investment in quality is 𝑏𝑏�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
and distance from mainstream is ?̅?𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = |1/2 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|, at the end of last generation, i.e., g=10; 
F statistics refer to ANOVA tests comparing the means of the 100 simulation runs among big 
or small studios; SD are in parenthesis; *p<.01. 
Table
Table E1. Design choices 
Scope of the 
model 
What aspects of the 
complex system under 
examination will be 
described in the model? 
The scope of this ABM is to study how competing studio producers invest in advertising and in quality 
when launching new movies. Our focus is on studios’ profit, which depends on studios’ investments and on 
movies’ viewership. Viewership of a movie consists of two parts: viewership at launch and at post-launch. 
Agents What agent types exist in the model? 
In this ABM there are two types of agents: 
• The studios that produce and launch new movies; 
• The consumers who make decisions about movie attendance. 
Properties What properties does each agent have? 
In this ABM the agents have the following properties: 
• Studios have three decision variables: investment in advertising, investment in quality, and the 
positioning of the movie with respect to consumers’ preferences for the target segment. Studios 
may or may not have budget constraints. This defines them as small or major studios, respectively. 
• Consumers are characterized by their preferences on the target segment. 
Behaviors What behaviors/actions does each agent possess? 
In this ABM the agents have the following behaviors: 
• Studios use decision rules, which determine how they set the value for their decision variables. In 
this ABM, there are two decision rules—the repeat and imitate rule and the trend rule. 
• Consumers decide which movie to attend or not to attend any movie. 
Environment 
What external forces act 
on each agent, including 
other agents and the 
external environment? 
In this ABM, the environment consists of three parameters: 
• The utility derived from alternative leisure activities (outside good). 
• The practical constraints of the movie's consumption. 
• WOM’s persuasiveness, i.e. the strength of word-of-mouth in the cinema market. 
These parameters are micro- and macro-face validated and remain constant during the simulation run. 
Input and 
Output 
What inputs to the model 
exist? What outputs can 
be collected from the 
model? 
The input of this ABM consists of the different decision rules assigned to the studios. In cases of 
competitions with small studios, the input is also the strength of their budgets’ constraints (weak, medium 
or strong). The output consists of the studios’ profits, their investments in advertising and quality, and the 
positioning of their movies. 
Time Step What is the order of events in the model? 
At each time step, studios produce and advertise their movies, making investment decisions on advertising 
and quality. Then they release their movies simultaneously, gather their viewership in two periods (launch 
and post-launch), and finally the two movies exit the market. 
 
Table
Figure 1. The competition setting 
 
Figure
Figure 2. Symmetric and asymmetric positioning 
 
Notes: Graphs A and B depict symmetric competitions. In Graph A, P1 and P2 are close to 
the mainstream and movies’ differentiation d is small, whereas in Graph B they are far from 
the mainstream and movies’ differentiation d is large. Graph C illustrates an asymmetric 
competition with a mainstream movie in the center of the target segment (P2) and a less 
mainstream movie that locates at the left extreme (P1). 
Figure
Figure 3. Typical runs of Scenarios A and B in Study 1 
 
Figure
Figure 4. Symmetric scenarios with different levels of differentiation 
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Figure 5. Competition between a small and a big studio 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Studio 1 is the small studio while Studio 2 is the big studio. Scenario A: Both studios 
use the repeat or imitate rule; Scenario B: Both studios use the trend rule; Scenario C: Studio 
1 uses the repeat or imitate rule and Studio 2 uses the trend rule; Scenario D: Studio 1 uses 
the trend rule and Studio 2 uses the repeat or imitate rule. Weak constraints: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑁; 
medium constraints: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑁/2; strong constraints: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑁/4. 
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Figure
Figure 6. A market with studios using weighted decision rules 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Weak constraints: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑁; medium constraints: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑁/2; strong constraints: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑁/4. 
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Figure 7. A market with weighted and evolving decision rules 
 
 
Notes: Weak constraints: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑁; medium constraints: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑁/2; strong constraints: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑁/4. 
Figure
Figure C1. An alternative formalization of movie positioning 
 
Figure
Figure E1. Movies’ releases in the U.S./Canadian motion picture industry 
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Figure G1. Convergence: Running means of studios’ profits 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Scenario A: Both studios use the repeat or imitate rule; Scenario B: Both studios use 
the trend rule; Scenario C: Studio 1 uses the repeat or imitate rule and Studio 2 uses the trend 
rule; Scenario D: Studio 1 uses the trend rule and Studio 2 uses the repeat or imitate rule. 
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